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The concept of “Liberal International Order” (LIO) is one of the most popular in contempo-
rary international relations. LIO received global recognition and became a key factor of inter-
national politics after the Second World War. Studies of the LIO have gone through periods 
of peaks and valleys since the Second World War. Nowadays, the studies are once again at the 
epicenter of political discussions. Academic studies of the LIO face difficult challenges since 
the concept has found itself in a ‘grey zone’ between two well-established disciplines — politi-
cal science and economics. Two factors, which signaled a deep crisis of the LIO are: 1) disaf-
fection of people living in Western democracies in multiple negative effects of globalization; 
2)  the progressive rising of powers such as China and Russia, whose political regimes are 
currently defined as illiberal. For many states in different parts of the world, the LIO did not 
generate prosperity for a majority of their population. Rather it led to an economically painful 
transformation from previous socio-economic systems as well as rising inequality. Member 
states of BRICS and of SCO have been and still are more respectful of the principles of the 
traditional Liberal International Order than the USA and western European countries. China 
currently is promoting a non-Western version of globalization, but it is still globalization with 
low customs barriers and the free movement of people, services and capital.
Keywords: Liberal International Order, BRICS, International Political Economy, Neo-Marx-
ism, embedded liberalism.
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In recent months many prominent experts have risen their voice on crisis of the lib-
eral international order (LIO), which has emerged after the Second World War and, with 
some pitfalls, would have been ruling the international system after the end of the Cold 
War thanks to the commitment of the United States and its Western allies. The order based 
on affirmation of values of the US East Coast progressive liberalism throughout all the 
international system. It is direct outcome of undisputed hegemony of the USA in world 
affairs. It has enjoyed the formal support of all successive US Presidential administrations 
from the dissolution of the USSR and until Donald Trump’ Administration in 2017.
LIO combined individual and collective freedoms with freedoms of movement for 
goods and capitals, giving life to economic globalization. The later had contradictory im-
pact on domestic socio-economic life of states all around the globe. On the one hand, it 
has considerably raised the standard of living of vast sections of populations in underde-
veloped regions of the world. On the other hand, globalization and LIO has considerably 
reduced the well-being’ level of middle and lower middle classes in the most economically 
advanced countries.
Our article is to evaluate current academic debates on crisis of LIO from perspec-
tive of the three dominant schools of International Political Economy (IPE): Liberal, Na-
tionalist and Neo-Marxist. We provide our answers on questions, which are essential for 
understanding of contemporary international relations: 1) If the demolition of unipolar 
US-centered LIO model is facilitating instability in international system? 2) If recent ef-
forts of China and Russia to preserve liberal nature of global economic system alongside 
with ruination of democracy promotion institutions, established by the USA in 1990s, 
may bring positive results?
In our research, we apply a number of IPE research methods [1]. This discipline stud-
ies causes and effects of interplay between economic and political processes. It provides 
researchers with extensive complex of theoretical and empirical tools, which, taken cumu-
latively, allow us to reconstruct diverse process of establishment and crisis of LIO as well 
as its constitutive political and economic elements.
Liberal International Order — definition
The concept of ‘Liberal International Order’ is one of the most popular in contem-
porary international relations. We may find roots of its genesis in the period of the First 
World War looking into attempts of US President Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) to estab-
lish innovative norms of interstate relations. Nonetheless, LIO received global recognition 
and became the key factor of international politics only after the Second World War.
The LIO concept has many adversarial interpretations. Majority of them assume that 
its’ the most important features are:
1) open markets and low trade barriers for interstate trade and investment flow;
2) management of global and regional affairs (problems, challenges) via multilateral 
institutions (the United Nations, GATT/WTO, NATO, European Union, etc.);
3) commitment of ruling political elites to values of liberal democracy and to 
expansion of its institutions even to regions and states where it faces stonewall;
4) apparent or latent recognition of US leadership in global affairs, readiness of 
sovereign states and intergovernmental organization of the “collective West” to 
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subordinate their priorities in spheres of security, politics and economy to national 
interests of the United States [2–4].
US scholar John Ikenberry from the Princeton University has formulated structural 
elements of the LIO as follows: “…economic openness, multilateral institutions, securi-
ty cooperation and democratic solidarity” [5, p. 7]. Amitav Acharia from the American 
University has defined LIO as «…an international system created and managed by the 
United States after World War II to promote capitalism and democracy through building 
alliances and multilateral institutions. Its supporters portray the liberal order as an open, 
rules-based and multilateral system that operates through consent rather than coercion» 
[6]. For John Mearscheimer from the Chicago University, the only truly international or-
der would be the one started after the end of the Cold war, with the Clinton presidency 
(1993–2001), thanks to the ability and determination of the power at that time hegemonic, 
the USA, to impose globally the values that should be defined as neoliberal [7].
In fact, contemporary neoliberals deviate from the respect for pluralism and for di-
versity of ideas and political views of the classical liberalism, dating back to the Great Brit-
ain of Queen Victoria. They also tend to separate domestic and international politics since 
successful extension of liberal principles into the sphere of international relations requires 
better protection of citizens in their own states, more interventionist social policy (Welfare 
State model) and establishment of ‘embedded liberalism’ policy as it has been presented by 
John Ruggie from Harvard University [8]. Many of the policies, originated from neoliberal 
perspective, including democracy promotion, humanitarian interventions and neoliberal 
economic policies (the Washington Consensus), have failed to achieve aims, desired by 
elites in the only superpower — the USA. At least two US Administrations since 1991 
(George W. Bush’ and Donald Tramp’ Administrations) have openly abandoned liberal 
internationalism altogether. They have replaced it by unilateralism, ignorance to inter-
national institutions, aggressive foreign policy and wide-scale violation of human rights 
oversees. Neoliberal economic policy of George W. Bush led in 2007-08 to a global finan-
cial crisis and in spring 2020 it has prevented Donald Trump’ Administration to establish 
global partnership of nations to react effectively to COVID-19 pandemic.
Michael N. Barnett (the George Washington University) rejects the whole idea of LIO. 
He has insisted that it was a myth than has been build up since the end of the Cold War 
by Western states that worry about a global governance that has favored them [9]. Indeed, 
only a few academics and politicians referred to the postwar international order as liberal 
one prior to the end of the Cold War. That is why popularity of the LIO concept right after 
collapse of the USSR could be explained by willingness to preserve newly emerged status-
quo in international relations under the name of liberalism. The Soviet regime’s dissolu-
tion has discredited the only viable alternative to liberal capitalist model and removed its 
main competitor, providing ‘security guarantee’ to emerging LIO.
Concept of liberalism has been well developed at the levels of individuals (issues of 
human right and duties of citizens) as well as of sovereign states (democratic constitu-
tions, liberal economic norms and civic institutions). However, the concept still requires 
integration into higher levels of political interaction: international and global ones. The 
core function of contemporary liberalism is in putting legal limits on what states can do to 
individuals. This element is almost absent in contemporary international relations. Sover-
eign states in their activities outside of their borders should respect norms of international 
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law, otherwise their actions could be seen as illegitimate and face oppression. All states, 
including economically weak ones, should assume multiple obligations as part of the LIO 
to protect intellectual property of the largest multinational corporations as well as to com-
mit their socially vulnerable sectors of economy (services, investments) to the multilateral 
liberalization agenda. Instead of millions of citizens with their rights and duties, there is a 
set of abstract actors at international/global arena (states, nations, corporations, etc.); but 
numerous freedoms, associated with liberalism at national-state’ level, are absent in rela-
tions between sovereign states and other global actors.
IPE schools on LIO: Nationalism, Liberalism, neo-Marxism
Studies of the LIO concept went through periods of peaks and valleys since the Second 
World War. Nowadays they once again at the epicenter of political and academic discus-
sions. For some scholars the LIO is maintaining its relevance in contemporary era [10–12], 
while for others its crush is inevitable and it poses real threat to global stability [13; 14].
Academic studies of the LIO face difficult challenge since the concept has found 
itself in a ‘grey zone’ between two well-established disciplines — political science and 
economics.
Many prominent political scientists in the USA and Western Europe are convinced that 
liberal norms has established fundamentals of international order on a substantial part of 
our planet after 1945, and they have prevailed in global politics since 1991 and up to the 
economic crisis of 2007–2009. These norms have been “…grounded in the essential value 
and dignity of each person and in universal human rights” [15, p. 20]. Because of that these 
norms “…enshrining individual rights and liberties” [15, p. 22]. Liberal norms limit, but not 
liquidate, military and economic power of individual states, for example, as consequence of 
their membership in inter-governmental organizations [16]. They also justify transbound-
ary use of military power, as in the case of UN-supported concept “the Responsibility to Pro-
tect” [17]. Spread of the LIO has faced resistance both during the period of the Cold War and 
later. Multiple attempts of American diplomacy to anchor LIO in norms of the international 
law have appeared to be unproductive. In retaliation for that, LIO adherents have adopted 
the concept of “rules-based order”. It was designed to equalize norms of international law, 
which have been formally adopted by sovereign states, with unspecified ‘rules of LIO’, which 
have been illegal from international law’ perspective. Thereby, we have witnessed in previous 
decades multiple attempts of the US diplomacy to undermine legal fundamentals of interna-
tional relations and replace them by arbitrary “rules”, which very often have been formulated 
at ad hoc basis. China and Russia have always made a stand against erosion of international 
law. In absolute majority of cases, they have political and diplomatic support from many 
sovereign states, including other BRICS member-states.
By contrast with political scientists, who are predominantly ambivalent towards per-
spective to apply concept of liberalism to interstate affairs, for economists liberalism is 
the dominant ideology and key theoretical perspective through much of the XX century. 
Its fierce struggle with extreme nationalism in two world wars as well as with communist 
regimes at the Cold war have ended up with triumph of liberal economic model in early 
1990s. Because of that LIO for economists is first of all the incarnation of global approval 
for liberal norms in economic sphere and the process of ongoing liberalization has been 
seen by economists as uncontainable up until recently.
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Liberalism on LIO
Contemporary liberals believe that rapid pro-market reforms, which serve the inter-
ests of private businesses, as well as institutions of democratic society, are crucial prereq-
uisites for successful socio-economic development, which has positive impact on interna-
tional relations and ability of sovereign states to project their power outwardly. Liberalism 
for them is a special form of governance, characterized by the rule of law, respect of indi-
vidual rights, protection of private property and political participation of citizens. These 
are features of ‘domestic dimension’ of liberalism, which could be extended into a domain 
of international politics via a set of intentional decisions and measures. They could be 
designed and put into action by national governments. But critics argue that extension of 
Western liberal principles into the international system has been accompanied by multiple 
military interventions as well as by insistent demands for economic liberalization, deregu-
lation and privatization in countries, which were not ready for such radical and socially-
painful reforms. Consequences in many cases have been disastrous — increasing poverty 
and inequality as well as political turmoil and violent conflicts.
Neoliberal institutionalism as one of the most influential schools of contemporary 
theory of international relations, still believe in virtue of LIO, emphasizing mutual inter-
est, which ‘new’ and ‘old’ great powers have in preservation of liberal international system 
emphasizing the limited ambitions of new great powers to change it [18].
Realism / Nationalism on LIO
In contemporary social science, the phenomenon of «national state» is located at pe-
riphery of research agenda for majority of scholars and is not able to compete with con-
cepts of globalization and regionalization. Meanwhile, the ‘peaceful rise of China’ and 
evident grievances in development of welfare states in Europe and North America have 
returned “national state” into research agenda of different schools in political and eco-
nomic sciences.
The conviction that international politics should be driven by protection of national 
interests is known for several centuries. Following the success of rapid economic develop-
ment in such different types of states as the US, Germany and Soviet Russia, economic 
nationalism in the late 19th — first quarter of 20th century dominated the field. Later, in 
the 1980–1990s, the popularity of economic nationalism has been disrupted by dogmas of 
the Washington Consensus, which reflected liberal principles of neoclassical economics, 
such as privatization, trade and financial liberalization, budget stabilization and fiscal con-
servatism. Nowadays, after the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, economic nationalism is 
returning to the centre stage of global politics. For contemporary nationalists, the solution 
to security dilemma is in construction of a “strong state”, turning structures of the execu-
tive branch of power into key drivers of national political and economic processes [19].
Theory of hegemonic stability, which is one of the most influential theoretical perspec-
tives in IR studies nowadays, belongs to the Realist school of International Political Econo-
my (IPE). It explains establishment of LIO by presenting it as a ‘side-effect’ of promotion by 
a hegemonic state (Britain in XIX century and USA in XX century) its national interests at 
international arena. By opening its vast domestic market for primary goods and low-quality 
products from satellite-states, the hegemonic power is demanding in return opening of their 
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domestic own markets for imported goods, services and capitals from all around the world, 
making international trade more open and less protectionist [1].
Transborder diffusion of institutions of democratic society and market economy fol-
lows opening of domestic markets and integration of satellite states into global economic 
system, those designed was developed by a hegemonic power. Consequently, for realists 
the LIO is not colliding with interests of states in global economic system. However, it 
requires their partial denial of sovereign rights as well as integration into global system 
as junior actors alongside rules, established by hegemon. Realists foresee negative conse-
quences of LIO collapse since it would inevitably bring back into world politics the great-
power rivalry and a resurgence of geopolitical struggle, known as ‘Thucydides Trap” [20].
Neo-Marxism on LIO
From perspective of the IPE, basic convictions of contemporary Neo-Marxism, 
which elaborate creative potential of the Dependency Theory and World-System Theory, 
are following:
 • рrimary and the most reliable source of state power is the control of capital goods;
 • the newest and the most advanced technologies are drivers of economic develop-
ment and reflection of state power in today’s world politics;
 • global political and economic system is a system of power relationship but not a 
free trade; the latter is reducing barriers between sovereign states; but it is not able 
to dismiss them in full;
 • world system is conservative, it has a propensity for opposition to innovations; that 
is why its changes are possible only by realization of giant projects (for example, 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative) or by coercive actions (for example, social revo-
lutions);
 • rising state power has been usually exploited for a certain type of changes in inter-
national system, that is why superior place in global hierarchy provides with ad-
ditional opportunities for making desirable changes in its structure and character 
of economic relationship.
Leaders in Russia, China as well as in dozens states around the world, share the opin-
ion of Immanuel Wallerstein on the architecture of the contemporary world system: the 
most developed 40–50 states of the Global North are “the core” and other almost 150 sov-
ereign states of the Global South are the “periphery” in the single political and economic 
system of contemporary world affairs [21]. Moreover, the BRICS leaders together with 
elites in developing states consider this system as unfair and required urgent and radical 
transformation. They challenge rules and leadership mission of LIO and try to offer po-
litical alternatives to liberal system of interstate relations. They agree with Neo-Marxists 
that even economic growth in the Global North’ states is driven nowadays not by a set of 
neoliberal institutions and policies, but by variety of state capitalism’ tools and practices. 
At the same time, BRICS states, especially China and Russia are interested in keeping basic 
elements of liberal economic order as the most important prerequisite for their sustainable 
political and social development.
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LIO in historical perspective
LIO concept together with the concept of democracy have shaped formation of inter-
national system after the Second World War. For some scholars, the LIO had to be open 
and rule-based, that is “…enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms 
such as multilateralism” [13; 14]. Meanwhile, an attempt to present the LIO as naturally 
determined result of long-term process of economic development and social transforma-
tion is purely political by its nature and it requests critical attitude.
According to Bruce Jones from the Brookings Institution, a tradition of American 
foreign policy, premised on defense of a ‘liberal international order’, has been dominating 
for 75 years since 1945. He has distinguished four phases of its development:
1) ‘brief and aspirational’ initial years, when the UN and Bretton-Woods institutions 
have been established (1945–1947);
2) ‘long and risky’ period of the Cold War, which have started from the Marshall 
Plan (1947–1990);
3) Two post-Cold War decades: first of them (1990s) have been used by Washington 
for advancement of multilateral institutions for trade and security and for 
invitation of formal rivals to join those institutions (NATO, GATT/WTO, IMF, 
the World Bank, etc.); while the second phase (2000s), which have started on 
September 11, 2001, manifested itself in decades-long American warfare in the 
wider Middle East and erosion of international support for American leadership;
4) Phase, which have started during global financial crisis (2007–2008) and the Arab 
Spring; it is going on until today [22]. The phase’s essence from perspective of 
the LIO is in erosion of international confidence to the capability of US leaders 
to manage international economic affairs as well as to contain rising powers — 
China, India, Russia, Brazil, and some others.
For Robert Keohane, a leading figure of the Neoliberal Institutionalism, even in 2012 
it was not too late to announce that previous two decades demonstrated ‘…the dominance 
of the view that cooperation in world politics can be enhanced through the construction 
and support of multilateral institutions based on liberal principles” [23, p. 125].
Michael Lind, the editor of influential US magazine The National Interest, rejects 
the very fact of existence of a sole liberal world order after the Second World War. He 
has noticed that there were “…several versions of the order, each lasting only a couple of 
decades before giving way to a somewhat different system that can still be described as 
liberal” [24]. That is why M. Lind does not foresee collapse of liberalism in global politics 
but rather expects appearing of a new system, which is likely to be an updated version of 
contemporary LIO.
In its complete form, the LIO has gained foothold only in-between states of Western 
Europe, North America and Japan. Initial period of LIO’s history have witnessed numer-
ous intergovernmental agreements, development of new global initiatives to reinforce 
economic liberalization, as well as energetic attempts to take care of the most dangerous 
externalities of global capitalism. The largest European democracies (United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, and Italy) have been committed to sacrifice to Washington their sover-
eignty in security and foreign affairs domains as well as to open their domestic markets 
for US capital [25]. Outside of the North Atlantic area, the LIO expansion have faced 
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multiple grievances. Cost / benefit analysis of the concept demonstrates that it has been 
able rather successfully destroy traditional structures of governance. But LIO was unable 
to embed new structures and institutions in such spheres as market economy, political af-
fairs and democratic institutions. The end of the Cold War has removed multiple barriers, 
which contained extension of US power in world affairs and created a unique ‘US unipolar 
moment’. The neoliberal revolution of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher has under-
mined the Keynesian “welfare state model” in North Atlantic area and cleaned space for 
experiments with export of liberal values and policies across the Globe.
Western Europe and Japan emerged as key partners, tying their security and econom-
ic fortunes to this extended liberal order. After the end of the Cold War, the liberal order 
spread outwards of its initial area. In 1990s dozens of states in Asia, Eastern Europe and 
Latin America conducted pro-market reforms and were integrated into the world econ-
omy. As the postwar order expanded, so too did institutions of its governance: the WTO 
has been launched (1994), the NATO has expanded eastward (2004), and the G20 took 
center stage (2008).
LIO initially has been limited to the Western states. It has got an opportunity for 
gradual extension to the Eastern bloc with the Helsinki act of 1975, and more effectively 
with the combination of the Gorbachev’s “New International Order” and “New Political 
Thinking” and the George H. W. Bush’s “New World Order” and “Europe whole and free”, 
presented at the US-USSR summit in Helsinki on September 9, 1990 [26].
Positive dynamics of George H. W. Bush’s Administration faded away with the presi-
dency of Bill Clinton, who with his slogan “democratic enlargement” moved away from 
the global mission for the United Nations implied by his predecessor. The new president 
have used a combination of economic sanctions and military coercion to put pressure on 
China, Haiti, Cuba, Serbia, and Bosnia to mention a few.
The new practice faced a very early criticism: in the fall issue of Foreign Affairs of 
1994 David Hendrikson observed that the same charters and declarations, that contained 
statements of the democratic entitlement, also reaffirmed the norm of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of sovereign states often in the strongest terms, while taking no account 
of the apparent contradiction. Additionally this policy seemed inexorably led to use of 
means intrinsically wicked [27]. With rapid evolution of the international standards, the 
USA has adopted a policy of exporting democracy even through operations aimed at the 
regime change in countries whose political system did not correspond to US-born criteria 
of liberal democracy.
In addition, the Clinton’s Administration has abolished in 1999 the Glass Steagall Act 
(1933), which was ruling the separation between the investment banks and the deposit 
banks. The full freedom of movement of capitals has been allowed, a practise soon pushed 
by the International Monetary Fund to all elements of the global financial system.
However, Bill Clinton, despite having launched this process of liberal assertiveness 
versus the full sovereignty of the states, has introduced into the political discussions in 
spring 1994  a concept, which has contradicted with all liberal international initiatives. 
Reacting to negative attitude of the American public opinion on multiple US military op-
erations abroad, especially on failure of American military intervention into civil war in 
Somalia, Presidential Directive no. 25 has asserted that the United States would continue 
to conduct peacekeeping operations abroad for protection of their national interest [28]. 
By doing so, US President laid out foundations for uncontrolled dissemination of nation-
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 13. Вып. 4 473
alism all around the global political system. From that moment on, the concept of national 
interest became a mantra for all the Western leaders who found in the reference to na-
tional interests a way to get an easier consent for their policies from citizens of their states.
This development helped to shape the reaction of public opinion in Western societies 
toward economic and political results of neo-liberal international order developed in the 
1990s. Freedom for flows of goods, services, capitals and people supervised in a way by new 
international arrangements. It has produced great challenges inside the Western countries 
and wedged a consistent disaffection for the policies initially greeted with great expecta-
tions. US Administrations has adopted practice of interventions in internal affairs of foreign 
countries to support “democratic and liberal” political forces there. That has done regularly 
through nongovernmental organizations intended to build civil society and spread democ-
racy around the world, blurring the line between public and private efforts. Meddling in 
other states’ domestic affairs was an old practice in international relations, but what was 
new was the overt and institutionalized nature of these activities. As Allen Weinstein, the 
co-founder of the National Endowment for Democracy, admitted in interview in1991: “A lot 
of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA” [29].
As for the economic side of the new liberal order, the hyper-globalization has pro-
duced since 1990s significant economic costs for large numbers of people inside the liberal 
democracies, including the USA. Those costs, including loss of jobs, declining or stag-
nant wages, and growing income inequality, have serious domestic political consequences, 
which further undermine the LIO [30].
Contemporary crisis of LIO: role of Russia and China
The LIO had begun to fall apart well before the BREXIT and victory of Donald Trump 
at 2016  US Presidential elections due to fundamental structural changes in the global 
economy. The peaceful rise of China and economic growth in non-Western states as well 
the WTO crisis appeared to be the key drivers. Donald Trump was able to exploit these 
processes for electoral purposes in electoral campaign of 2016, but their origins predate 
his presidency.
The first factor of crisis of the LIO could be found in disaffection of people living in 
Western democracies in multiple negative effects of globalization. Second factor is the 
progressive rising of powers such as China and Russia, those political regimes have been 
defined as illiberal [31; 32]. These two states as well as other BRICS countries do not affiliate 
themselves with progressive liberalism. They repeatedly demonstrate their dissatisfaction 
with Western military adventures, allegedly adopted to protect international institutions, 
economic liberalization, human rights and democracy [33]. Russia and China as BRICS’ 
leaders criticize the foundations of existing LIO and have begun to construct newly 
invented international institutions to undermine it (the New Development Bank, the Pool 
of Conventional Currency Reserves, Asian Infrastructure Investments Bank).
Instead of ‘competition’, which is traditional for liberalism, the key motto of contem-
porary Chinese elite in international affairs is ‘connectivity’. It has been presented to global 
public opinion as policy, designed to foster mutual developments that ‘benefit all partici-
pants along the Silk Road in an open and non-exclusive manner” [34, p. 311]. With some 
reservations, we may interpret this policy as contemporary reincarnation of centuries-old 
Marxist slogan “Workers of the world, Unite!” Nevertheless, in contemporary era a simi-
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lar appeal should be addressed towards national markets and representatives of national 
government-controlled businesses, which are functioning under protection of their na-
tional legislation.
Since the late 1970s, China’s strategy of socio-economic development has been as-
signed to find a proper place in the system of global capitalism rather than to build so-
cialism or create an anti-imperialist international alliance. For many years Beijing has 
been in search for a proper way to connect its domestic markets with foreign ones. China 
carefully avoided using interference in domestic affairs of foreign states as an instrument 
to accomplish its strategy of connectivity. Contemporary Chinese elite is divided into na-
tionalist and globalist factions, but each of them accept the need to export capital to over-
seas markets and to use incoming FDI for expanding influence in international relations. 
For Chinese leaders, globalization is the path to wealth, power and international as well 
as domestic legitimacy. Russian leaders agree with that agenda, even if they are not able 
to benefit from globalization due to severe economic sanctions, imposed by the USA and 
European Union in 2014.
Harmony in attitudes of China and Russia towards negative consequences of forth-
right implementation of LIO dogmas could be acknowledged by their teamplay within a 
framework of international organizations and forums, where two states are members.
On the eve of the St. Petersburg G8 summit in July 2006 well-informed observer of 
Russian politics Dmitri Trenin from Moscow Carnegie Centre has published an article, 
entitled “Russia Leaves the West” [35]. He has argued that, despite the transformation 
of G7 into G8 to include Russia, Moscow was gradually moving away from the West. It 
was due to the perceived substantial denial of Russian national interests by the Western 
powers. In September 2006, at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, 
the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, after the traditional three-way consultation 
with his Chinese and Indian colleagues, has invited Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to a common discussion. Therefore, for the first time he carried out a consultation of four, 
which configured the format, which has been defined as ‘BRIC’ only a few years earlier in 
a Goldman Sachs document [36]. The meeting had a positive outcome and the four min-
isters decided to continue those informal contacts.
After reiteration of this consultation in New York the following year (September 
2007), the Minister Lavrov has invited his colleagues to meet in Russian city of Yeka-
terinburg on May 16, 2008. The same city of Yekaterinburg has become the venue for 
the first meeting BRIC leaders, arranged on June 16, 2009  by newly elected Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev. So, in June 2009 the praxis of the regular annual BRIC has 
started and it is still underway today. The first BRIC summit took place next day after 
summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, another important inter-govern-
mental organization, where China and Russia are founding members1. In Yekaterinburg 
four BRIC leaders has adopted joint declaration, those fifteen points consistently cen-
tred on the repeatedly stated aspiration to establish a democratic and multipolar world 
order [37].
The resilience of the BRIC (BRICS since 2011) format and the closeness of the Chi-
na’s positions to ones of Russia was strengthened in 2013 by the new Chinese President 
Xi Jinping. 8 days after his election to China’s office (March 14, 2013), Xi Jinping made 
1 India has become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member-state in 2017.
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the first state visit abroad to Moscow (March 22, 2013) to confirm the high-priority 
character of Russian-Chinese relations for Beijing’s foreign policy. President of China 
has confirmed also support of his country to efforts of Russia aimed to protect its na-
tional sovereignty and security. Xi Jinping concluded that China and Russia had similar 
or even identical positions on major international and regional issues as well as com-
mon interests [38]. Therefore, they had decided that in the future they would have to 
continue to strengthen their coordination and reciprocity of positions for the solution 
of the most important questions.
We shall refer mainly to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS 
because their members are three largest Eurasian states: China, Russia and India. Their 
closeness in perception of contemporary international order has been reasserted during 
recent trilateral meeting of their leaders at G20 Osaka Summit (June 2019). According to 
Russian President Vladimir Putin: “…our countries are in favour of preserving the system 
of international relations, whose core is the UN Charter and the rule of law. We uphold 
such important principles of interstate relations as respect for sovereignty and non-inter-
ference in domestic affairs.” President Putin has emphasized geopolitical mission of the 
UN, BRICS, SCO and G20, as well as “strengthening the authority of the WTO” and the 
IMF as the “paragon of a modern and just multipolar world that denies sanctions as legiti-
mate actions” [39]. Statement of very similar content have been delivered by the Chinese 
and the Indian leaders at the same event [40; 41].
Conclusion
For many states, contemporary LIO did not generate neither peace nor prosperity 
for majority of their population. Rather it led to economically painful transformation of 
previous socio-economic systems as well as rising inequality. Long-term aim of China 
and Russia is to transform existing US-centric LIO into a multi-polar one, where will be 
enough room for developing nations, which are unsatisfied with US unilateralism. Aim of 
opponents to existing LIO is not to defeat USA and its allies in a fierce struggle for world 
power. Rather, BRICS and many other sovereign states aspire to reorganize Western-cen-
tered rules and institutions of existing global system. Both Beijing and Moscow would 
be interested in accepting a hypothetical model of the Democratic International Order, 
when co-governance by the G7 and BRICS will become reality. Current deep crisis of LIO 
shows that it is impossible to reach global stability without elimination of US unilateral-
ism. China and Russia as leaders of BRICS and SCO are in search for alternative model, 
which will guarantee basic “goods” of LIO  — economic openness, reliable multilateral 
institutions and security cooperation. As He Yafei, vice-minister at the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office noted recently: “Reglobalization does not mean throwing away the current 
global governance system. China has repeatedly expressed its firm position that it wants 
to safeguard, reinforce and reform the existing governance system” [42]. We agree with 
Matthew D. Stephen: ‘a “new global governance” is materializing that is strongly contested, 
less universal, less liberal, and more fragmented’ [43].
For China and Russia, sovereignty has never stopped to be the supreme value of their 
statecraft. Speed of the two states’ integration into global political and economic affairs 
was predicated by scope of threats for their sovereignty. The search for balance between 
protection of sovereignly (priority for the Nationalist School of IPE) and relative open-
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ness of global markets (priority for Liberal School of IPE) is the central element of their 
attempts to reform contemporary LIO. We believe that a number of policy tools, borrowed 
from the Neo-Marxist School of IPE, will be used intensively in the process.
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